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Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel in Federal Tax
Litigation
I.

INTRODUCTION

An issue decided in federal tax litigation' involving one taxpayer often may arise in a subsequent tax dispute involving another tax year, transaction, or taxpayer. For example, corporation
X makes a distribution in year 1 to its similarly situated stockholders, Y and Z. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a determination in a Tax Court or refund suit that the distribution was a
nontaxable return of capital to Y in year 1 could not be relitigated
by the government against Y if the issue arose in a subsequent action. Traditionally applied by federal courts in both tax2 and nontax cases,3 collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation by a party
of an issue of fact or law decided against him in a prior proceeding
based upon a different cause of action.4 Under the much discussed'
1. Although the term "federal tax litigation" can encompass a broad variety of civil
and criminal actions arising out of the administration of the tax laws, this Note will focus on
taxpayer/government actions concerning disputed tax liability. These actions include proceedings in the Tax Court to contest income, estate, or gift tax deficiencies, and suits in
either the Court of Claims or federal district courts for refunds of taxes paid. For a general
discussion of taxpayer initiated litigation, see A. SANTA BARBARA, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 359-86 (1977).
2. During the formative years of federal taxation, doubt existed as to whether and to
what extent the principles of judicial finality would apply in litigation involving tax disputes. The Supreme Court made it clear in 1933, however, that res judicata and collateral
estoppel applied in tax cases. See Tait v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 620 (1933). For a
discussion of the uncertainty of the status of these doctrines in early cases, see Griswold, Res
Judicatain Federal Tax Cases, 46 YALE L.J. 1320 (1937); Paul & Zimet, FederalTax Litigation-Selected Problems in Res Judicata,32 ILL. L. REv. 139 (1937).
3. See, e.g., Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
4. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970); Lawlor v. National Screen Serv.
Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955). See generally 1B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.441 (2d ed.
1974); Scott, CollateralEstoppel By Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1942). Courts have generally used the term "collateral estoppel" to describe the preclusive effect of a judgment
upon a subsequent suit based upon a different cause of action. Several commentators, however, have used the term "issue preclusion" to refer to the same effect. See, e.g., Vestal,
Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 IowA L. REv. 27 (1964). The drafters of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments have adopted the latter term. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 68, 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) [hereinafter cited as TD-4]. This
Note will use the two terms interchangeably. Courts and commentators may also use the
term "res judicata" to refer generally to the principles of judicial finality, including collateral estoppel. 1B MoORE's, supra 0.441[2], at 3775. More frequently, however, res judicata
refers to a bar of a second suit between the same parties (or those in privity with them)
based on the same cause of action that was litigated in a former suit. Id. See Commissioner
v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948).
5. E.g., Currie, Civil Procedure:The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25 (1965); Currie, Mutuality of Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957);
Greenebaum, In Defense of the Doctrine of Mutuality of Estoppel, 45 IND. L.J. 1 (1969);
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"mutuality rule," however, collateral estoppel would not preclude
the litigation of the same issue by the taxing authorities against Z.
The mutuality doctrine limits the application of collateral estoppel
by precluding relitigation of a previously decided issue only when
the prior judgment binds both parties in the second suit.' The doctrine in effect requires that the parties in the second suit be the
same as or in privity with those in the first action. In the example
above, Z could not assert the issue determination made in the action against Y. Z was not a party to that action and judgment
against Y instead of for him could not have bound Z.7
Although firmly entrenched at common law,' the mutuality
rule is dying a slow death irthe federal courts. The Supreme Court
expressed limited approval of "nonmutual estoppel" 9 in 1971,1° although many lower courts had abandoned the mutuality rule prior
to that date." Despite the trend away from a rigid mutuality requirement and toward a flexible approach based on notions of fairness, both the Tax Court and other federal courts, notably the Second Circuit in Divine v. Commissioner,12 have continued to retain
the mutuality rule in federal tax cases. 13 The Supreme Court in
Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TuL. L. REv. 301 (1961);
Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLuM. L. REv. 1457
(1968). For a recent attempt to apply probability theory to the mutuality issue, see Note, A
ProbabilisticAnalysis of the Doctrine of Mutuality of CollateralEstoppel, 76 MiCH. L. REv.
612 (1978).
6. 1B MOORE'S, supra note 4, 0.412[l].
7. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S.
313, 329 (1971); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940); Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666
(6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974). A judgment may bind a nonparty to the
first action, however, if he actually controlled the prior litigation or was in privity with one
of the parties. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979). For a general discussion
of the limitations of due process on the preclusive effect of judgments on nonparties, see F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, Crvm PROCEDURE § 11.22, at 575-76 (2d ed. 1977).
8. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912); Stone v. Farmers' Bank, 174 U.S. 409 (1899); Litchfield v. Goodnow, 123 U.S. 549, 552 (1887); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMEN'S

§ 93 (1942).

9. "Nonmutual estoppel" will be used in this Note to characterize the assertion of a
determination made in a prior action as preclusive of an issue in a subsequent action despite
the fact that the party seeking preclusion was not a party, or in privity with a party, in the
prior action.
10. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313
(1971). For a discussion of Blonder-Tongue, see notes 39-52 infra and accompanying text.
11. E.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966); Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894
(4th Cir. 1965); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
865 (1950).
12. 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974). See text accompanying notes 79-84 infra.
13. Sparks Nugget, Inc. v. Commissioner, 458 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972); Teitelbaum v.
Commissioner, 346 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1965); Britt v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 10 (4th Cir.
1940); Stewart Gammill, 62 T.C. 607 (1974) (dictum); Charles M. Bernuth, 57 T.C. 225
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ParklaneHosiery Co. v.Shore" and the Ninth Circuit in Starker v.
United States,1 however, recently cast considerable doubt on the
continuing viability of the mutuality principle in tax cases. The
purpose of this Note is to examine the current status of the mutuality rule as an element of the law of collateral estoppel in the tax
area. First, the Note briefly traces the demise of the mutuality rule
in nontax cases. Second, the Note discusses the cases examining
the rule in tax disputes and argues that courts should not require
mutuality as an absolute rule before collateral estoppel can apply.
Finally, the Note proposes a framework within which courts should
analyze nonmutual estoppel claims in federal tax cases.
II.

THE MUTUALITY RULE IN FEDERAL COURTS: NONTAX CASES

A.

The Bernhard Doctrine
Prior to 1942, courts uniformly accepted the mutuality rule as
a principle of "general elementary law.""8 The following example
further illustrates the operation of the rule. B was a passenger in a
car driven by A that collided with a car negligently driven by C. If
A prevailed in an action against C, C could still relitigate the issue
of his negligence if he was later sued by B. Even if all the other
requirements for the application of collateral estoppel were present, 7 mutuality of estoppel would not exist because B was not a
party in the prior action and would not have been bound had C
prevailed in the first action. 8
(1971), aff'd 470 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1972); American Range Lines, Inc., 17 T.C. 764, rev'd on
other grounds, 200 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1952); Robert D. Wray [1978] TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H)
78,488 (Dec. 11, 1978); William Albert Belcher, Jr., [1965] TAx CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H)"
65,001 (Jan. 8, 1965). See 3 L. CAsEY, FEDERAL TAx PRAcTIcE § 11.18, at 278-79 (rev. ed.
1977). But see Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979); Kurlan v. Commissioner, 343 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Abatti, 463 F. Supp. 596 (S.D. Cal.
1978); Baily v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
14. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
15. 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
16. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912).
17. In order for collateral estoppel to apply even when the parties in both actions are
identical, the issue must actually have been litigated, the determination generally must
have been necessary to the prior judgment, and the controlling law and facts must be substantially identical in both actions. See generally 10 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAxArnoN § 60.19-29 (1976). Application of these requirements has proved especially difficult
for courts in federal tax cases. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979);
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944). See generally 3 L. CASEY, supra note 13, § 11.18. This Note
will assume (unless otherwise stated), however, that these requirements have been met and
that collateral estoppel would apply but for the lack of mutuality.
18. It should be noted that C might be permitted to relitigate the issue in this situation even if mutuality were not required because most courts have recognized that collateral
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Critics attacked the mutuality rule because it allowed a party
to relitigate an issue as long as appropriate defendants were available. 9 The Supreme Court of California in 1942 was the first court
to clearly repudiate the mutuality rule. In Bernhard v. Bank of
0 Justice Traynor expressed the view that only the party
America"
against whom the plea of collateral estoppel is asserted must have
been a party or in privity with a party to the prior action. In an
often cited passage the court stated:
There is no compelling reason. . . for requiring that the party asserting
the plea of res judicata [or collateral estoppel] must have been a party,
or in privity with a party, to the earlier litigation. No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality. Just
why a party who was not bound by a previous action should be precluded from asserting it2 . . . against a party who was bound by it is
difficult to comprehend. '

Abrogation of the mutuality requirement, generally referred to as
the "BernhardDoctrine, '2 has gained substantial support in other
states. 23 The influence of Bernhard has been so pervasive that, as
early as 1967, one court proclaimed the mutuality doctrine a "dead
letter."' That conclusion proved premature, however, since a few
states have reaffirmed the mutuality rule in recent decisions, 2 and
several commentators have continued to voice approval of the
rule. 26 Nevertheless, the tentative drafts of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments have adopted the Bernhard Doctrine, and it
estoppel may be refused if the party asserting the plea deliberately refused to join as a party
to the prior action. See note 118 infra and accompanying text.
19. E.g., Cox, Res Adjudicata: Who Entitled to Plead, 9 VA. L. REG. 241 (1923).
20. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
21. Id. at 812, 122 P.2d at 894. One should note that Justice Traynor's use of the term
res judicata was in its broader sense, including collateral estoppel. See note 4 supra.
22. See, e.g., Currie, Mutuality of Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN.
L. REv. 281 (1957); Semmel, supra note 5, at 1466-71.
23. For a collection of cases in which courts have abandoned the rule, see Annot., 31
A.L.R.3d 1044 (1970 and Supp. 1979).
24. DeWitt v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 147, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 601, 225 N.E. 2d 195, 198
(1967).
25. E.g., Newport Div., Tenneco Chems., Inc. v. Thompson, 330 So. 2d 826 (Fla. App.
1976); Keith v. Schiefen-Stockham Ins. Agency, Inc., 209 Kan. 537, 498 P.2d 265 (1972),
Atencio v. Vigil, 86 N.M. 181, 521 P.2d 646 (1974); Blake v. Norman, 37 N.C. App. 617, 247
S.E.2d 256 (1978).
26. See, e.g., Note, supra note 5. The author of this Note lists four traditional criticisms of the Bernhard Doctrine: first, it is not necessary to prevent multiple harassment;
second, it is inconsistent with the principles of in personam jurisdiction; third, it may increase the number of appeals despite decreasing the number of trials; and last, the abandonment of mutuality burdens litigation resources of the party subject to estoppel and prevents
him from allocating them properly. Id. at 680-88.
27. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTs App. § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as TD-3].
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clearly represents the modern trend.2s
B.

The Bernhard Doctrine in Federal Courts

Bernhard has had a dramatic influence upon lower federal
courts. Although the Supreme Court did not indicate approval of
the Bernhard Doctrine until 1971, a number of lower federal courts,
when left free to apply federal law," applied collateral estoppel in
the absence of mutuality. For example, in Bruszewski v. United
States0 a longshoreman brought a personal injury action against a
steamship company that had operated a ship owned by the United
States. The trial resulted in a directed verdict for defendant on the
ground that plaintiff failed to establish lack of due care. When
plaintiff sought to litigate the same claim against the United
States, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
the second action on the ground that collateral estoppel barred
plaintiff from relitigating the negligence issue. The court applied
collateral estoppel despite the fact that the United States was not
a party in the prior proceeding because "a party who has had one
full and fair opportunity to prove a claim and has failed in that
effort, should not be permitted to go to trial on the merits of that
claim a second time."3 Bruszewski illustrates "defensive" use of
nonmutual collateral estoppel, in which a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from asserting a claim that the plaintiff has previously litigated and lost against another defendant. 2
Several early post-Bernhard decisions also recognized the "offensive" use of nonmutual estoppel. Offensive use describes the situation in which a plaintiff seeks to foreclose a defendant from relitigating an issue that the defendant has already litigated
unsuccessfully in an action instituted by another party.3 In United
States v. United Air Lines, Inc.3" a judgment had been rendered in
favor of representatives of twenty-four victims of an airplane accident. In a second action by the representatives of ten other victims,
28. F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, supra note 7, § 11.24.
29. A federal court exercising its diversity jurisdiction may be required to apply the
mutuality rule if applicable state law so provides. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 324 (1971). Since federal tax cases involve inherently federal claims, however, courts apply federal principles of collateral estoppel. See generally Vestal, Res JudicatalPreclusionby Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66
MICH. L. REv. 1723 (1968); Annot., 19 A.L.R. Fed. 709 (1974 and Supp. 1979).
30. 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950).
31. 181 F.2d at 421.
32. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.4 (1979).
33. Id.
34. 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash. and D. Nev. 1962), aff'd, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
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the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the representatives on the issue of liability, holding that the first judgment
estopped the carrier from relitigating the issue of negligence. Another example of offensive use is Zdanok v. Glidden Co.35 In Zdanok a group of employees successfully litigated a number of issues
arising under a collective bargaining agreement concerning employment rights at the employer's relocated plant. That litigation eventually reached the Supreme Court on a procedural issue. 6 In a later
suit by an identically situated group of employees, the Second Circuit held that the employer was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues decided against him in the prior action. The court
noted that the employer had "fully and fairly" litigated those issues in the prior action despite his defensive posture.37 Although
not all federal courts agreed that offensive use was proper," the
major area of disagreement in subsequent decisions was not
whether nonmutual estoppel could ever be asserted, but rather
under what circumstances it should be applied.
C.
(1)

The Supreme Court and Nonmutual Estoppel

Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation

The Supreme Court first expressed approval of defensive nonmutual estoppel in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University
of Illinois Foundation.9 In Blonder-Tongue a patent assignee had
sued an alleged infringer of the patent in the Southern District of
Iowa. The district court found for the defendant on the ground that
the patented invention was obvious to one ordinarily skilled in the
art. The judgment was affirmed on appeal." Prior to the appellate
decision, plaintiff filed a second infringement suit against a different alleged infringer in the Northern District of Illinois. In the second action, the trial court held the patent valid. The Second Cir35. 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
36. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). The issue before the Supreme
Court was the constitutionality of the affirmance of the lower court judgment; the defect
claimed was that one member of the panel (the author of the opinion) was a member of the
Court of Claims, sitting by designation.
37. 327 F.2d at 956.
38. See, e.g., Capital Invs., Inc. v. Bank of Sturgeon Bay, 430 F. Supp. 534, 539 (E.D.
Wis. 1977), in which the court stated that "[the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel is no
longer in force in the Seventh Circuit, at least where collateral estoppel is pleaded as a

defense" (emphasis added).
39.

402 U.S. 313 (1971).

40. University of Ill. Foundation v. Winegard Co., 271 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Iowa 1967),
aff'd, 402 F.2d 125 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 917 (1968).
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cuit affirmed, relying on an earlier Supreme Court decision,
Triplett v. Lowell,4" which held that a determination of patent invalidity did not collaterally estop the patentee in subsequent litigation against a different defendant. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that "the uncritical acceptance of the principle of mutuality of estoppel. . . is today out of place [and that] Triplett should
be overruled to the extent it forecloses a plea of estoppel by one
infringement of a patent that has once been defacing a charge 4 of
2
clared invalid.
The Court in Blonder-Tongue clearly stopped short of announcing an absolute rejection of the mutuality rule.4 3 The Court
indicated its doubt, however, "whether it is any longer tenable to
afford a litigant more than one full and fair opportunity for judicial
resolution of the same issue."" The opinion discussed the mutuality principle in terms generally applicable to the defensive use of
nonmutual estoppel in cases other than patent disputes:
In any lawsuit where a defendant, because of the mutuality principle, is
forced to present a complete defense on the merits to a claim which the
plaintiff has fully litigated and lost in a prior action, there is an arguable misallocation of iesources. To the extent the defendant in the second suit may not win by asserting, without contradiction, that the
plaintiff had fully and fairly, but unsuccessfully, litigated the same
claim in the prior suit, the defendant's time and money are diverted
from alternative uses ...

to relitigation of a decided issue.... Permit-

ting repeated litigation of the same issue as long as the supply of unrelated defendants holds out reflects either the aura of the gaming table
or "a lack of discipline and disinterestedness on the part of the lower
courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rules of
procedure.""s

In view of the Court's broad statements and the strong justifications for requiring mutuality in patent litigation," courts generally
regarded Blonder-Tongue as endorsing defensive use of nonmutual
41. 297 U.S. 638 (1936).
42. 402 U.S. at 350.
43. While noting the general trend away from the mutuality doctine, the Court framed
the issue before it in narrow terms:
[Tihe court-produced doctrine of mutuality of estoppel is undergoing fundamental
change in the common-law tradition. In its pristine formulation, an increasing number
of courts have rejected the principle as unsound .... [T]hese mutations in estoppel
doctrine are not before us for wholesale approval or rejection. But at the very least they
counsel us to re-examine whether mutuality of estoppel is a viable rule where a patentee seeks to relitigate the validity of a patent once a federal court has declared it to be
invalid.
Id. at 327.
44. Id. at 328.
45. Id. at 329.
46. See, e.g., Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936); Technograph Printed Circuits,
Ltd. v. United States, 372 F.2d 969 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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collateral estoppel." Instead of requiring mutuality as an absolute
rule when a defendant used collateral estoppel defensively, lower
courts looked to the facts of each case to determine whether the
issue was fully and fairly litigated in the prior action and whether
any reason compelled relitigation. 5
Blonder-Tongue's acceptance of the rationale underlying the
abrogation of the mutuality rule left two major questions unanswered. First, the Court did not address the issue of offensive use of
nonmutual collateral estoppel. It declined to comment on the validity of criticisms advanced to limit the availability*of offensive
use even if the mutuality rule was rejected." Second, the Court did
not eliminate the possibility that the mutuality rule might continue to be a viable requirement in some classes of cases. One earlier case rejecting the mutuality rule argued that the rule should be
retained when a party sought preclusion on an issue "subject to the
varying appraisals of the facts by different juries."5 Similarly,
Blonder-Tongue also did not mention the numerous federal tax
cases in which courts retained the mutuality rule long after Bernhard." Thus, some courts have not read Blonder-Tongue as a blanket rejection of the mutuality rule.2
(2)

Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Parklane Hosiery Co.
v. Shore" extende, . the Court's blessing to offensive use of nonmutual collateral estoppel and established a framework for analysis
of all nonmutual estoppel pleas. The decision answered many of
the questions not addressed by the Court in Blonder-Tongue and
apparently sounded the death knell for the mutuality rule. In Park47. See,. e.g., Johnson v. United States, 576 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1978); Poster Exchange,
Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 517 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054
(1976); Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1974); Cardillo v. Zyla,
486 F.2d 473 (1st Cir. 1973); P I Enterprises, Inc. v. Cataldo, 457 F.2d 1012 (1st Cir. 1972).
48. Courts allowing nonmutual estoppel have generally adopted a requirement that the
disputed issue was "fully and fairly" litigated in a prior action. If the issue were so litigated,
then collateral estoppel will normally apply unless the party against whom preclusion is
sought can establish some compelling reason for allowing relitigation of the issue. See F.
JAhms & G. HAZARD, supra note 7, § 11.25.
49. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 22; Semmel, supra note 5; Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of CollateralEstoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO. WAsH. L. REv.
1010 (1967).
50. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d at 956.
51. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Anaconda Co., 445 F. Supp. 486, 495 (D.D.C. 1977)

(court stated "it is clear that Blonder-Tongue is not a wholesale rejection of the requirement
of mutuality.").
53.

439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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lane Hosiery the Securities and Exchange Commission sought injunctive relief against Parklane Hosiery and twelve of its officers
and directors, alleging that defendants had issued a materially
false and misleading proxy statement in connection with a proposed merger. 4 Prior to the filing of the SEC action, private
stockholders filed a class action against the same defendants based
upon the same transaction. The district court granted the SEC relief and the Second Circuit affirmed. 5 Plaintiffs then moved for
summary judgment on the issue of the materiality of the alleged
defects in the proxy statement. The trial court denied the motion
on the ground that the use of collateral estoppel would violate defendants' right to jury trial." The Second Circuit reversed the trial
court, holding that the use of collateral estoppel under the circumstances presented did not violate the seventh amendment. 57 The
Second Circuit did not view the lack of mutuality as rendering the
doctrine inapplicable, stating summarily that mutuality was no
longer required.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's holding that
a determination made in an equitable action could preclude relitigation of that issue in a subsequent legal action brought by a nonparty to the first action." Before addressing that issue, however,
the Court first determined "whether a litigant who was not a party
54. The complaint alleged: (1) that the proxy statement issued to stockholders failed
to disclose that the president of the company would benefit from the merger; (2) that certain
negotiations had not been disclosed; and (3) that appraisal of the Parklane stock was not
based on sufficient information. See id. at 324 n.1.
55. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd 558 F.2d
1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
56. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 325 (1979). The district court
denied the requested relief in a one sentence order, citing a decision of the Fifth Circuit,
Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), which held the use of collateral estoppel under
similar circumstances violative of the seventh amendment. For a critical commentary on
Rachal, see Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trials inCivil Cases: A Comment on
Rachal v. Hill, 85 HAnv. L. Rxv. 442 (1971).
57. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 439 U.S. 322
(1979). For a discussion of the conflict on the jury trial issue betwen Rachal and the Second
Circuit in ParklaneHosiery, which is beyond the scope of this Note, see Note, Right to Jury
Trial and Collateral Estoppel in Securites Litigation, 42 ALB. L. REv. 733 (1978); Note,
Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co.: The Seventh Amendment and CollateralEstoppel, 66 CALiF.
L. REV. 861 (1978); Note, Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel and the Seventh Amendment, 47
FORDHAm L. REV. 75 (1978); Note, Collateral Estoppel and the Right to a Jury Trial, 57 NEB.
L. REV. 863 (1978). See also Note, Mutuality of Estoppel and the Seventh Amendment: The
Effect of Parklane Hosiery, 64 CoRNELL L. REv. 1002, 1018-29 (1979).
58. 565 F.2d at 818-19.
59. The Court held that "if. . .the law of collateral estoppel forecloses the petitioners
from relitigating the factual issues determined against them in the SEC action, nothing in
the Seventh Amendment dictates a different result." 439 U.S. at 337.
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to a prior judgment may nevertheless use that judgment 'offensively' to prevent a defendant from relitigating issues resolved in
the earlier proceeding.""0 The Court recognized that offensive collateral estoppel presents somewhat different considerations than
defensive use. First, the Court noted that offensive use might actually increase litigation by encouraging plaintiffs not to intervene in
pending actions in anticipation of another plaintiffs favorable
judgment.' Second, the Court recognized the unfairness of offensive use when the prior action involved a small amount, was inconsistent with another prior judgment, or foreclosed a plaintiff from
exercising procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action
that were available in the second."2 Refusing to preclude the offensive use of collateral estoppel in the absence of mutuality, the
Court held that trial courts should exercise "broad discretion to determine when it should be applied." 3 Announcing a rule to govern
the exercise of a court's discretion, the Court stated that "in cases
where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or
where . . . the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to
a defendant, a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel." 6 The Court implicitly endorsed the view that
when such countervailing considerations are not present, courts
should prohibit a litigant from relitigating an issue that he has
fully and fairly litigated in a prior action with a different party.
Applying this standard to the facts in ParklaneHosiery, the Court
held that defendants had received a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issues in question in the SEC injunctive action and
were therefore collaterally estopped on those issues in the private
5
action.
The Parklane Hosiery decision represents an approval of the
60. Id. at 326.
61. Id. at 330.
62. Id. at 330-31.
63. Id. at 331 (footnote omitted).
64. Id. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist refused to sanction this test. The dissenting Justice disagreed with the majority on the jury trial issue and stated that "[b]ecause I believe
that the use of offensive collateral estoppel in this particular case was improper, it is not
necessary for me to decide whether I would approve its use in circumstances where the defendant's right to a jury trial was not impaired." Id. at 339 n.1.
65. The Court noted that since private actions are foreseeable following most SEC actions, defendants had every incentive to litigate the issues in the prior action. The Court also
noted the absence of any prior inconsistent determination of the disputed issues and the
availability of equivalent procedural opportunities in both actions. The Court mysteriously
refused to recognize the absence of a jury trial right as such a procedural opportunity, however, stating that "the presence or absence of a jury as factfinder is basically neutral, quite
unlike, for example, the necessity of defending the first lawsuit in an inconvenient forum."
Id. at 332 n.19.
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retreat from the mutuality requirement rather than a significant
change in the law. Nevertheless, the decision is instructive for examining the current status of the mutuality rule in federal tax
cases. First, the Court's holding removes any doubt that the reasoning behind Blonder-Tongue's limited sanction of defensive nonmutual estoppel also supports the application of offensive use. Second, ParkIane Hosiery confirmed that an absolute mutuality rule
no longer exists in federal courts. Thus, Parklane Hosiery represents the culmination of a trend initiated by the California Supreme Court in Bernhard and augmented by Blonder-Tongue. Federal tax cases, however, did not reflect this trend; the vast majority
of courts continued to require mutuality as an essential element of
collateral estoppel." The next section of this Note will discuss the
application of the mutuality rule to federal tax cases and will analyze the impact of the Parklane Hosiery decision on tax litigation.
Il.

THE MuTuALirY RULE IN FEDERAL COURTS: TAX CASES
A.

TraditionalApproach

The mutuality rule could prevent the application of collateral
estoppel against either the government or a taxpayer in federal tax
cases. In perhaps the most typical case, the rule would prevent taxpayer A from asserting issue determinations decided against the
government in a case involving taxpayer B. Although the government was a party to both suits (regardless of whether the prior action was a refund or Tax Court suit),6 7 taxpayer A does not satisfy
the mutuality requirement because he was not a party to the action
against taxpayer B. Normally, a decision cannot bind a taxpayer
unless he was a party to the action or in privity with a party." The
mutuality rule, however, also prevents the application of collateral
estoppel in favor of federal taxing authorities if a taxpayer raises
an issue that he unsuccessfully litigated in a state or federal court
against state taxing authorities or a private party." The taxpayer
66. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
67. The United States, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and the district directors are all treated as the same party for the purposes of applying the rules of res judicata
and collateral estoppel. I.R.C. § 7422(c).

68. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
69. Generally, if the United States was not a party in a prior state court proceeding or
a federal suit involving private parties, the mutuality rule prevents application of collateral
estoppel against a taxpayer as to issues decided against the taxpayer in that prior action.
Since state law may be at issue in a tax case, however, the forum in a federal tax dispute
may be bound by the state court decision if it was appealed to the highest court of the state.
See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). Furthermore, if the issue was
decided in an action not appealed to the highest court in the state in which it was decided, a
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seeking to use nonmutual collateral estoppel has his choice of forums. He would be the plaintiff in a refund suit and the petitioner
in a Tax Court suit. Because in both situations the taxpayer must
overcome the presumption that the Commissioner's assessment is
correct, the taxpayer would apparently seek offensive preclusion."
Conversely, the government would act defensively in asserting
collateral estoppel against a taxpayer on issues decided against the
taxpayer in a prior suit not involving disputed federal tax
liability.
Early federal tax decisions mirrored the view in other contexts
that mutuality was an essential requirement for the application of
collateral estoppel. For example, in Appeal of Suhr7 1 the taxpayer
contested a deficiency based on the valuation of certain stock on
the date of its acquisition by the taxpayer. The taxpayer argued
that two earlier federal court decisions holding the taxpayer's valuation proper collaterally estopped the Commissioner from litigating
the issue. The Board of Tax Appeals noted that the taxpayer had
not been a party to those actions and summarily rejected the contention that collateral estoppel applied.72
As some courts began to relax or reject the mutuality principle
in other contexts, the Tax Court and other courts maintained the
rule in tax cases without questioning its soundness. In Elsie K. Mathisen7 3 the taxpayer contested deficiencies based upon the Commissioner's contention that the income from a certain limited partnership was separate property taxable to her in full, rather than
community property as alleged by the taxpayer. The taxpayer argued that an earlier Tax Court decision involving the general partners collaterally estopped the Commissioner from relitigating the
issues decided against the government. The court rejected the taxpayer's contention, stating that "[iut cannot be questioned that petitioner was not, in terms, a party to the . . . case upon which she
relies for her plea of . . . estoppel by judgment [collateral estoppel]. Identity of parties is a prerequisite to the success of that contention."7 4 As in Suhr, the court did not base its decision on any
factors peculiar to tax litigation, but simply applied without quesfederal tax court may nevertheless give proper regard to the state court decision in deciding
a matter of state law. Thus, the state court decision could be "binding" on the taxpayer,
although not by reason of collateral estoppel.
70. See Harold S. Divine, 59 T.C. 152, 157 n.5 (1972), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir.
1974).
71. 4 B.T.A. 1198 (1926).
72. Id. at 1200.
73. 22 T.C. 995 (1954).
74. Id. at 998.
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tion the common law mutuality rule.
B.

Divine v. Commissioner

The Tax Court's decision in Harold S. Divine" marked the
first attempt by a tax court to reconcile the retention of the mutuality rule in tax cases with the opposite trend endorsed in BlonderTongue. In the Tax Court proceeding Divine contested the Commissioner's determination that a certain corporate distribution was
a taxable dividend. Another stockholder in the same corporation
had successfully argued in an appeal to a different circuit that the
same distribution was a nontaxable return of capital. 76 That determination involved the complex issue of the effect of bargain sales of
company stock on the earnings and profits of the corporation.17 The
Tax Court refused to apply collateral estoppel to preclude relitigation of the issue by the government in Divine's case. Although the
court stated that it was "mindful of the judicial trend which has
undermined the principle of mutuality, '78 the court concluded that
a number of policy considerations required retention of the rule in
tax cases.
The Second Circuit in Divine v. Commissioner" affirmed the
Tax Court's refusal to apply collateral estoppel in the absence of
mutuality, relying primarily on two of the factors identified by the
Tax Court. After distinguishing Blonder-Tongue and the circuit's
prior acceptance of offensive nonmutual estoppel in a nontax case, 0
the court emphasized that the mutuality rule was necessary in tax
cases to promote further inquiry into issues subject to conflict between the different circuits. Because of the complex nature of
many tax issues" and the Supreme Court's reluctance to grant cer75.
76.
(1968).

59 T.C. 152 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974).
See Luckman v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'g 50 T.C. 619

77. A corporate distribution is taxable as a dividend to the extent that it comes out of
"earnings and profits" accumulated in a taxable year after 1913. See I.R.C. §§ 301(c), 316.
See generally B. BrrrKER & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION OF CORPORMnoNS AND
SHAREHOLDERS

§ 7.01 (4th ed. 1979).

78. 59 T.C. at 158.
79. 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'g 59 T.C. 152 (1972). Divine is noted with approval in 60 IOWA L. REV. 1420 (1975) and criticized in 73 MiCH. L. REV. 604 (1975).

80. 500 F.2d at 1050. The court rested its decision on "policy grounds" because it did
not regard either Blonder-Tongue or its earlier decision in Zdanok v. Glidden, 327 F.2d 944
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964), as controlling. For a discussion of Zdanok, see
text accompanying notes 35-37 supra. The court rejected the premise that Blonder-Tongue
totally abrogated the mutuality rule and viewed Zdanok as applying only to cases in which
the disputed issue was not subject to "varying appraisals." 500 F.2d at 1051.
81. In discussing this fact, the court in Divine stated:
More so than most laws the tax statutes are far reaching and affect or might affect
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tiorari in tax cases, the court reasoned that nonmutual estoppel
would delay the development of circuit conflicts and diminish the
chances for Supreme Court review of an issue. " The court also justified its refusal to allow nonmutual estoppel by stating ihat a contrary holding "could with little difficulty be extrapolated to estop
the Commissioner from relitigating a tax issue when the facts are
quite dissimilar." The court apparently viewed such a possibility
as a usurpation of the function of stare decisis. A concurring judge
agreed with the specific holding of the court on the collateral estoppel issue, but implied that he might approve the use of nonmutual
estoppel in tax cases that "turned on the resolution of a complex
84
common issue of fact."

In its policy analysis of the need for the mutuality rule, the
Second Circuit correctly recognized that tax litigation presents factors not considered by courts rejecting the mutuality rule in nontax
cases. The court did not clearly state, however, that mutuality
should be required as a matter of law in any tax case in which a
litigant asserts collateral estoppel. s5 Nevertheless, several courts
subsequently interpreted Divine as simply retaining the mutuality
rule for all tax cases. The Tax Court in Stewart Gammill5 referred
to its decision in Divine as an example of its consistent adherence
to the mutuality rule.87 Thus, the mutuality rule in tax cases survived Blonder-Tongue, and the effect of Divine was largely to reaffirm the mechanical approach taken by earlier courts.
C. Early Decisions Accepting Nonmutual Estoppel
A small minority of courts prior to Parklane Hosiery accepted
the view that collateral estoppel could apply in a tax case in the
absence of mutuality. In Kurlan v. Commissioner' the Second Cirmillions of citizens. The issues which arise in the course of administering these laws are
thus of importance not only to the particular litigants but also to the general public.
Moreover, because of the sheer extent of the subject matter of the revenue laws and
their intricate language, the issues will often be pure issues of law concerning the interpretation of novel and cryptic sections of the Code. Thus, because of the unusual complexity of the tax laws, judicial conflicts over interpretations of law, as opposed to disagreement as to how the law should be applied to specific facts, are much more apt to
occur than in other areas of judicial concern.
500 F.2d at 1048-49.
82. Id. at 1049.
83. Id. at 1050.
84. Id. at 1057 (Friendly, J., concurring and dissenting).
85. But cf. Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 57 n.11 (2d Cir. 1978) (court cited Divine,
stating that the mutuality requirement was not totally eliminated in the Second Circuit).
86. 62 T.C. 607 (1974).
87. Id. at 615.
88. 343 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1965).
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cuit held that a taxpayer was collaterally estopped from relitigating
issues decided against him in a state court action. The state court
had decided several issues that the Tax Court held determinative
of the capital asset status of certain television techniques. The taxpayer argued that since the Commissioner was not a party to the
state court proceeding, the mutuality rule should have rendered
collateral estoppel inapplicable. The court noted that the taxpayer
had overlooked the abrogation of the mutuality rule and rejected
the contention that the taxpayer could relitigate the issues decided
against him in the state court action.
A district court also invoked nonmutual collateral estoppel in
favor of the government in Baily v. United States." In Baily the
taxpayer sued to recover amounts levied upon by the Service for
failure of a business, in which the taxpayer was allegedly a partner,
to pay withholding taxes. Subsequent to the assessment, the
taxpayer filed suit in state court seeking to recover money advanced to the business on the ground that the money had been
intended as a loan. The state court held that the money was advanced pursuant to a partnership agreement. The district court
then granted summary judgment for the government in the tax
proceeding, holding that Baily was collaterally estopped from relitigating the question of whether he was a partner in the business.
The court noted that the issue had been fully and fairly litigated in
the state court action. Refusing to follow Divine, the court held
that "mutuality of parties is not required for the application of collateral estoppel in a tax case provided that the party sought to be
estopped has had a 'full and fair' opportunity to try the factual
issue in the first proceeding." 0
Nonmutual collateral estoppel was applied in favor of a taxpayer in United States v. Abatti.11 Although Abatti was a criminal
tax fraud case, the district court framed its opinion in terms broad
enough to include civil tax litigation as well. In Abatti the government brought tax evasion charges against Abatti and charged his
accountant, Macklin, with aiding in the preparation of false tax
returns. Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings, the
Commissioner had asserted deficiencies against Abatti and several
relatives for the same years at issue in the criminal proceeding.
The Tax Court in the civil case ruled in favor of Abatti, and both
Abatti and Macklin moved to dismiss the indictments in the criminal case on the ground that the Tax Court had decided the deft89.
90.
91.

355 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Id. at 328.
463 F. Supp. 596 (S.D. Cal. 1978).
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ciency issue. The district court granted the motions as to both parties, despite the fact that Macklin had not been a party to the Tax
Court case. 2 The court stated that it could see "no good reason for
a per se rule of mutuality in tax cases.

93

Although recognizing the

concern expressed in Divine that mutuality was needed to stimulate resolution of legal issues, 4 the court determined that relitigation of the issues in Abatti could not resolve uncertainties in the
tax laws.
The decisions in Kurlan, Baily and Abatti did not reflect the
majority view that mutuality was a prerequisite for the application
of collateral estoppel in any tax case. The facts of these cases, however, presented the courts with situations in which application of
the principles of judicial finality would not burden the administration of the tax laws or cause inequitable results. Despite these
anomalous decisions, Divine clearly has remained the governing
approach.
D. Starker v. United States: Death of the Rule?
The first case to consider the impact of Parklane Hosiery on
the law of collateral estoppel in the tax area was Starker v. United
States. 5 In Starker, the taxpayer, his son, and his daughter-in-law
entered into a "land exchange agreement" with Crown Zellerbach
Corporation to convey certain land in Oregon to the corporation. In
exchange, the corporation agreed to deed certain property to the
taxpayers over a period of five years. The agreement also provided
for a "growth factor" under which the corporation would add six
percent to the value of land to be transferred each year to the father. The taxpayers reported no gain on the transactions on the
ground that the series of conveyances qualified as like-kind exchanges. The Service asserted deficiencies of over $300,000 against
the father and over $35,000 against the son and daughter-in-law,
contesting the applicability of the like-kind exchange provisions
and regarding the growth factor as income. Both taxpayers paid
the tax and sued for a refund in an Oregon district court. The court
first tried the case of the son and daughter-in-law and entered a
judgment for the taxpayers. 7 The government appealed, but voluntarily dismissed the appeal. The trial court then rejected the fa92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 604. Macklin also claimed no privity relationship with Abatti. Id. at 602.
Id. at 603.
Id. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1343. See I.R.C. § 1031.
See Starker v. United States, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-1550 (D. Or. 1975).
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ther's argument that the first decision collaterally estopped the
government from relitigating the issues decided against it, partly
because the father was not a party in the first case.9 8 The Ninth
Circuit, however, reversed the trial court on the mutuality issue,
holding that collateral estoppel could apply in the absence of
mutuality.
The government failed to convince the Starker court that the
mutuality rule should be retained in federal tax cases. The court
distinguished Divine by noting that both of the relevant actions in
Starker arose in the same circuit, unlike the situation in Divine.9
The court also questioned the reasoning of Divine and expressed
doubt whether the Divine rationale survived ParklaneHosiery even
in cases arising in different circuits.1 1 Applying ParklandHosiery's
"new analysis for cases presenting offensive collateral estoppel,"'1'
the court concluded that the government's opportunity to litigate
the issues in the first case precluded relitigation of those issues in
the second case. First, the court noted that the size of the refund in
the first action gave the government adequate incentive and opportunity to fully litigate the issues in that suit. Second, the decision
in the first action was not inconsistent with any prior authority.
Third, the second action did not offer procedural advantages unavailable in the first action. Finally, the first action afforded a full
and fair opportunity for the government to argue the disputed issues. The court further noted that while the father technically
could have joined in the other action, 102 there were numerous explanations for his choosing not to do so.
The Service has not yet indicated whether and to what extent
it will continue to urge the retention of the mutuality rule after
Starker. Other courts may not agree with the Ninth Circuit that
Parklane Hosiery mandates rejection of the mutuality rule in tax
98.
evidence
99.
100.

The father was not in privity with the parties in the first suit, and there was no
that he controlled or financed the action. 602 F.2d at 1348.
Id. at 1348-49 n.5.
The court stated:

[Elven as to tax cases arising in different circuits-a situation we do not have before

us-we question the reasoning in Divine.... [T]he only parties who can invoke collateral estoppel are those whose transactions are so similar to those of previously victorious taxpayers that there is no question that the result under prior cases would have
been identical. Thus, the abandonment of mutuality of estoppel in multiple-circuit situations could cause no undue decrease in the ability of the Internal Revenue Service to
enforce the tax laws equitably. It would simply require the Service to accept similar

results for similarly situated taxpayers, and heighten the incentive for it to litigate all
aspects of tax cases vigorously the first time around.
101.
102.

Id. at 1349.
Id. See note 117 infra.
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cases. Although the Court in Parklane Hosiery mentioned no exceptions to its rejection of an absolute mutuality rule, some courts
may be unwilling to extend the Court's holding in a securities action to federal tax litigation. Furthermore, some courts could accept the ParklaneHosiery/Starkeranalysis that mutuality is not an
absolute requirement for collateral estoppel in tax cases, but rarely
exercise their discretion to allow nonmutual estoppel. This approach would retain a de facto mutuality rule and finds some support in the tentative drafts to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments."0 3 Finally, some courts may accept the Starker court's
suggestion that mutuality should not be required in intra-circuit
cases, but maintain Divine's preclusion of nonmutual estoppel in
cases appealable to different circuits.
The probable result, however, is that after Parklane Hosiery
federal courts in tax controversies cannot dismiss a collateral estoppel claim solely on the basis of lack of mutuality. ParklaneHosiery
rejected several of the grounds advanced in Divine and other cases
as limitations on the scope of nonmutual estoppel. The court in
Divine had not interpreted Blonder-Tongue as a total abrogation of
the mutuality rule,104 but this possible limitation did not find renewed support in ParklaneHosiery. Instead, the Court extended its
endorsement to offensive as well as defensive use, and, as noted
previously, did not suggest any class of cases in which it would retain the mutuality rule. The Court's application of nonmutual collateral estoppel to a securities fraud action also suggests that any
distinction based upon issues "not subject to varying appraisals"'0 °
is no longer viable."0 ' Disapproval of these limitations does not require that courts disregard any of the factors noted in Divine and
liberally allow nonmutual estoppel in a variety of circumstances.
Courts should recognize, however, that Parklane Hosiery has replaced a rigid rule with a discretionary approach. Courts should
allow nonmutual collateral estoppel when, as in Kurlan, Baily and
A batti, preclusion will serve the purposes of judicial finality without disrupting the administration of the tax laws. Courts could still
deny nonmutual collateral estoppel when the issue was purely legal
and the action from which preclusion is sought concerned an unrelated transaction or was appealable to a different circuit.
103. See TD-3, supra note 27, App. § 88 & comment i.
104. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
105. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
106. One should categorize the issue on which plaintiffs asserted collateral estoppel in
ParklaneHosiery, the materiality of a defect in a proxy statement under the securities laws,
with those issues subject to varying determinations by the courts. See Fink v. Coates, 323 F.
Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

1980]

TAX COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

The court in Starker properly applied the two-step inquiry
adopted in Parklane Hosiery to govern the exercise of judicial discretion in allowing nonmutual collateral estoppel. First, future
courts should determine whether an issue raised in a federal tax
case was fully and fairly litigated by the taxpayer in a prior case
not involving the government (if the government asserts defensive
use), or by the government in a tax dispute with another taxpayer
(if a taxpayer seeks offensive collateral estoppel against the government). Second, courts should determine whether some compelling
circumstance warrants relitigation of the disputed issue even if it
was fully litigated in a prior action. In applying both of these tests,
courts should consider the unique aspects of tax litigation and the
policies of efficient but equitable administration of the tax laws.
The next section of this Note will attempt to examine those factors
that courts should consider in determining whether to exercise
their discretion in favor of allowing nonmutual estoppel in an individual case.
IV.
A.

A SUGGESTED ANALYSIS

The "Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate" Test in Tax
Cases

In examining a nonmutual estoppel plea in a tax case, courts
must first determine whether the disputed issue was "fully and
fairly" litigated in a prior action by the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted. As in nontax cases, no specific rules can
be formulated for making this determination. Factors identified by
courts in other contexts, however, are particularly significant in tax
disputes. First, if a taxpayer seeks preclusion against the government and if the the prior action concerned only a small amount,
relitigation may be warranted."7 The court in Starker might have
asserted that the amount of the deficiency in the prior case was
minimal compared to the amount in the action in which collateral
estoppel was asserted.' 8 Similarly, if a taxpayer litigated an issue
in a state court proceeding concerning a small amount, application
of collateral estoppel against him on that issue in a federal tax
matter might be inappropriate. In either case the party arguing
against preclusion may have had insufficient incentive to litigate
fully or to appeal the prior case.
Procedural aspects of the first action may also warrant relitiga107.
108.

See TD-4, supra note 4, § 68.1 & comment j.
See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
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tion of a previously decided issue. For example, if the party against
whom estoppel is asserted could not have appealed the decision,
then the court may refuse to apply collateral estoppel.' 9 The first
action may have offered procedural disadvantages, such as severely
limited discovery, that would make a court reluctant to preclude
relitigation of the issue in an action affording greater procedural
opportunities.110 The availability of a jury trial in the second action
may weigh in favor of refusing collateral estoppel if such a right
was unavailable in the original action.' The problem of greater
procedural opportunities would arise more frequently, however, in
cases of defensive estoppel by the government than in offensive use
by the taxpayer.
The Court in Parklane Hosiery indicated that although courts
now have discretion to allow offensive nonmutual estoppel, they
may require a "stronger showing that the prior opportunity [to litigate the disputed issue] was adequate" in cases of offensive use
than in cases of defensive use."12 Thus, courts in tax cases may
properly require that taxpayers asserting prior judgments demonstrate convincingly that the government litigated the prior action
to the fullest extent possible, that the government was aware of the
potential for or existence of the second taxpayer's claim, and perhaps that application of collateral estoppel would result in a reduction in the time spent in litigation. Courts should not use this factor, however, as an excuse to routinely allow nonmutual estoppel in
favor of the government while denying it in favor of taxpayers.
A final consideration in applying the fairness test is the forseeability of subsequent litigation. If the party against whom preclusion is asserted could not anticipate that the issue litigated and
lost in a prior action would arise in a later action against another
party, the court should consider whether the issue merits relitigation."3 The question of forseeability is less relevant in cases of defensive use by the government because businessmen plan many
transactions that give rise to nontax litigation with the tax consequences of the transaction in mind. In some situations, however,
the tenuous relationship between the subject matter of nontax litigation and the tax consequences of the transaction could warrant
relitigation of the issue by the taxpayer.
These factors are by no means an exclusive list. The basic in109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
440 (5th

See TD-4, supra note 4, § 68.1(a) & comment a.
TD-3, supra note 27, App. §§ 68.1(c), 88(2).
Id. App. § 88(2), comment d. But see note 65 supra.
439 U.S. at 331 n.16. See TD-3, supra note 27, App. § 88, Reporter's Note at 171.
TD-4, supra note 4, § 68.1(d)(ii). See Mosher Steel Co. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 436,
Cir. 1978).
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quiry should be whether the issue on which a party seeks preclusion was adjudicated in a forum under procedural conditions approximating those in the federal tax proceeding and under
circumstances providing the litigant with an adequate opportunity
to vigorously litigate the issue.
B.

The "Compelling Circumstances" Exception

Courts recognizing nonmutual estoppel in nontax cases have
acknowledged that certain compelling circumstances may require
relitigation of a decided issue even if the previous determination
was the result of full and fair litigation. The Restatement (Second)
of Judgments lists seven such circumstances,114 although the list is
not intended to be exclusive." 5 Several of these "exceptions" are
particularly relevant to courts faced with nonmutual estoppel pleas
in tax cases. For example, a court may refuse preclusion if the
party asserting the prior judgment could have joined in the prior
action."' Joinder of taxpayers is technically possible in many
cases," 7 although, as the Starker court noted, courts should not pe114. The Restatement (Second) provides in part:
A party precluded from relitigating an issue with an opposing party, in accordance with
[general rules of issue preclusion] is also precluded from doing so with another person
unless the fact that he lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first
action or other circumstances justify affording him an opportunity to relitigate the issue. The circumstances to which consideration should be given include . . . whether:
(1) Treating the issue as conclusively determined would be incompatible with an
applicable scheme of administering the remedies in the actions involved;
(2) The forum in the second action affords the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted procedural opportunities in the presentation and determination of the
issue that were not available in the first action and could likely result in the issue being
differently determined;
(3) The person seeking to invoke favorable preclusion, or to avoid unfavorable
preclusion, could have effected joinder in the first action between himself and his present adversary;
(4) The determination relied on as preclusive was itself inconsistent with another
determination of the same issue;
(5) The prior determination may have been affected by relationships among the
parties to the first action that are not present in the subsequent action, or was based on
a compromise verdict or finding;
(6) Treating the issue as conclusively determined may complicate determination
of issues in the subsequent action or prejudice the interests of another party thereto;
(7) The issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively determined would inappropriately foreclose opportunity for obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule upon
which it was based.
TD-3, supra note 27, App. § 88(1)-(7).
115. The drafters of the new Restatement have provided that "other compelling circumstances" may make issue preclusion inappropriate. TD-3, supra note 27, App. § 88(8).
116. See, e.g.,
Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (1958).
117. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for permissive joinder of all persons
asserting a right to relief "arising out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of trans-
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nalize the taxpayer when there are valid reasons for not joining.118
Thus, a court might properly refuse to allow offensive estoppel by a
taxpayer when it is obvious that the taxpayer did not join the prior
action because he hoped for a favorable judgment without losing
the chance to litigate the matter for himself.
Another recognized exception to nonmutual estoppel provides
that an applicable scheme of remedies may limit the preclusive effect of judgments. The clearest example of this limitation occurs in
the area of antitrust enforcement. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act
provides that government obtained decrees in civil and criminal
antitrust proceedings constitute prima facie evidence in subsequent
private actions based on the same violations. 9 Some federal courts
have construed the statute as preempting the common law concept
of collateral estoppel. 2 ' Although the Internal Revenue Code contains no similar provision limiting the preclusive effect of judgments in tax litigation, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments espouses the view that the basic nature of the federal tax structure
constitutes an inherent limitation on the scope of collateral estoppel. 2 ' In particular, the so-called Golsen rule, under which the Tax
Court is bound only by decisions of the court of appeals to which
appeal would lie, 22 constitutes a complicating factor in determining the scope of collateral estoppel in tax disputes.'1 Widespread
application of nonmutual collateral estoppel could distort application of the Golsen rule by allowing taxpayers to take advantage of a
favorable determination in one circuit, even though the court of appeals in the taxpayer's circuit had rejected the taxpayer's view of
the issue in question.1 24 The Golsen rule does not support absolute
actions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in
the action." FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a). The rules of the Tax Court and the Court of Claims
contain similar provisions. U.S. TAX CT.R. PRAc. & PRoc. 61(a); U.S. CT.CL. R. 63(a).
118. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976).
120. See, e.g., Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 690 (1961) (dictum); Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 308 F. Supp. 584, 589-90 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd,
453 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972). But see McWilliams, Federal Antitrust Decrees: Should They Be Given Conclusive Effect in a Subsequent Private
Action?, 48 Miss. L.J. 1 (1977); Note, The Use of Government Judgments in Private Antitrust Litigation: Clayton Act Section 5(a), CollateralEstoppel, and Jury Trial, 43 U. Cm. L.
Ray. 338 (1976).
121. See TD-4, supra note 4, § 68.1 & comment c.
122. I.R.C. § 7482 governs venue for appeals from Tax Court decisions. For a general

discussion of the appellate process in tax proceedings, see 9 J.
INCOME TAXATION § 51.03 (1977).
123.
nied, 404
124.
73 MicH.
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See Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. deU.S. 940 (1971).
See Note, CollateralEstoppel: Loosening the Mutuality Rule in Tax Litigation,
L. REv. 604, 614-15 (1975).
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rejection of nonmutual estoppel in multiple circuit cases, notwithstanding Divine."5 Application of nonmutual estoppel to a factual
issue in a multiple circuit case would not conflict with the Golsen
rule; courts should not promote circuit conflict on purely factual
matters. Courts should be reluctant to grant collateral estoppel,
however, on issues which have generated conflict among the
circuits.
Courts should be most reluctant to apply issue preclusion in
favor of a nonparty to a prior action when the issue is primarily a
pure question of law that arose in a factually unrelated case. Although this exception would apply regardless of the mutuality issue,"2 6 it should be important, if not controlling, to a court considering a nonmutual estoppel plea. Allowing nonmutual estoppel in
such cases could promote an overabundance of suits by taxpayers
seeking to bring themselves within the scope of erroneous, but
favorable, decisions.' 27 Courts should limit nonmutual estoppel to
cases in which the disputed issue is either one of fact or a mixed
question of fact and law decided in the context of transactions factually related to those at issue in the tax proceeding. Such cases
would be limited in number and would have little effect on the application of the Golsen rule.
C.

Policy Considerations

After determining whether the disputed issue was fully and
fairly litigated in a prior proceeding and whether the case falls
within some recognized exception to the rule against relitigation of
a decided issue, courts should also consider the proposed result in
light of policy considerations peculiar to federal tax litigation.
First, it is a well-established rule that courts narrowly construe the
doctrine of collateral estoppel in tax cases. In the leading case of
Commissioner v. Sunnen'2 5 the Supreme Court sharply limited the
availability of the doctrine to cases in which a party sought to relitigate a previously decided issue "where the controlling facts and
applicable legal rules remain unchanged. ' 12 9 Although courts have
had difficulty applying the Sunnen rule ' and have questioned its
125. See notes 99-100 supra and accompanying text.
126. See United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242 (1924). See also TD-4, supra note 4
§ 68.1(b)(i).
127. See 60 IowA L. REv. 1420, 1431 (1975).
128. 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
129. Id. at 599-600.
130. See generally Branscomb, CollateralEstoppel In Tax Cases: Static and Separable
Facts, 37 TEx. L. REV. 584 (1959).
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requirements,1 31 the Sunnen Court's admonition that the doctrine
of collateral estoppel should be applied sparingly in tax cases has
become a fixture of the law. Applied to the mutuality issue, the
doctrine counsels courts in close cases to allow relitigation of an
issue which has been previously litigated.
A second policy consideration is the extent to which the application of nonmutual estoppel would burden the collection of the
national revenue."3 2 Although courts addressing the mutuality rule
in tax cases have not discussed this factor directly,13 some courts
view nonmutual estoppel as simply a new "weapon" for the taxpayer. For example, the court in Divine addressed only the justifications for prohibiting a taxpayer from using collateral estoppel offensively against the government.' Courts should exercise some
restraint in applying nonmutual estoppel in favor of taxpayers because widespread application of the doctrine could force the Service to settle more cases prematurely or to appeal more decisions;
burden the system and increase the size of
such application would
3
1
dockets.
appellate
Balanced against the two foregoing policy considerations,
which may weigh in favor of refusing nonmutual estoppel in a
given case, are the policies of terminating repetitious litigation and
of treating similarly situated taxpayers in an equitable fashion. In
many cases, particularly those in which the disputed issue is a factual one, application of nonmutual estoppel would significantly
conserve both judicial and litigant resources. The court's refusal to
allow nonmutual estoppel in such a case would simply allow the
party against whom estoppel was asserted to try again. Furthermore, application of collateral estoppel in cases of offensive use by
taxpayers could in many cases help to insure that parties to transactions receive more uniform tax treatment.
As the Supreme Court noted in Blonder-Tongue, "no one set of
facts, no one collection of words or phrases, will provide an automatic formula for proper rulings on estoppel pleas."' 3 6 Nevertheless, federal courts are equally competent in tax cases to consider
131. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 158-62 (1979).
132. Although this Note has stated that the mutuality rule can operate in some cases
to refuse the benefits of collateral estoppel to the government, it is likely that taxpayer attempts to use nonmutual estoppel offensively against the government would be far more
frequent.
133. But cf. Divine v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 152, 160 (1972) (court stated that "the
total removal of the mutuality principle from tax cases [would place] a far greater burden
on respondent [the Commissioner] than on private parties").
134. 500 F.2d at 1048-50.
135. See 60 IowA L. Rxv. 1420, 1432 (1975).
136. 402 U.S. at 333-34.
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the relevant factors of each case in determining whether collateral
estoppel will apply in the absence of mutuality. This section has
attempted to identify some of the factors that courts should consider in order to reflect the policies of judicial finality and of equitable administration of the tax laws.
V.

CONCLUSION

The problems of overcrowded court dockets and increases in
the expense and time involved in litigation have grown steadily in
recent years. Because of these developments, the principle that
courts should give a party no more than one full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue has gained wide approval. The retention of
the mutuality rule as an absolute requirement for the application
of collateral estoppel is inconsistent with this "one chance to litigate" formula. This Note has argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Parklane Hosiery and the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Starker v. United States have sounded the death knell for the mutuality rule in its final stronghold-federal tax litigation. Courts
can apply the principles of "nonmutual estoppel" in some tax cases
consistently with the often conflicting goals of fairness, efficient administration of the tax laws, and elimination of needless litigation.
With the discretion afforded courts in Parklane Hosiery and illustrated in Starker, federal tax forums should refuse to allow the mutuality rule to govern them from its grave.
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